Transformation of science and technology systems into systems of innovation in Central and Eastern Europe: the emerging patterns and determinants by Radosevic, S
Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
 
TRANSFORMATION OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY SYSTEMS INTO 
SYSTEMS OF INNOVATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE:  
THE EMERGING PATTERNS AND DETERMINANTS1 
 
Slavo Radosevic 
 
Abstract 
 
This paper explores patterns of transformation of socialist S&T systems into post-
socialist systems of innovation and their determinants. First, we reinterpret the 
socialist period from a systems of innovation perspective by revisiting the socialist 
S&T system and by pointing to its general features as well as to its national and 
sectoral variations. Second, we develop a conceptual model to help to understand the 
factors that are determining the emergence of systems of innovation. Systems of 
innovation in CEE are being shaped through the interaction of micro, sectoral, 
national and regional determinants. At present, sectoral differences and micro-specific 
determinants seem to be the strongest in this process. The process of development and 
selection of network organisers is at the core of the emergence of systems of 
innovation in central and eastern Europe (CEE). The most active network organisers 
are foreign firms. New production and innovation networks, especially in central 
Europe, are most often foreign-led.  
                                                 
1Research which formed the basis for this paper is part of the project ‘Restructuring and re-integration 
of S&T systems of economies in transition’ funded by the EC - DG XII Targeted Socio Economic 
Research Programme. Previous versions of this paper were presented at the TSER project workshop at 
Sussex University (June 1997), ASEAT Conference at UMIST Manchester (September 1997) and at 
the Annual Conference of the European Association for Evolutionary Political Economy (Athens, 
November 1997). I am grateful to Birgit Andersen, Jan Annerstedt, Keith Pavitt, Werner Meske, 
Christian von Hirschhausen and three anonymous referees for valuable comments on the previous 
versions of this paper. However, all remaining errors remain my responsibility. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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1. Introduction 
 
The main problem of socialism was in its dynamic efficiency or (in)ability to 
innovate in the long-term (Hanson and Pavitt, 1987). As Murrel (1990) shows central 
and eastern European countries’ (CEECs) foreign trade was quite in line with 
expected comparative advantages thus indicating that allocative efficiency was not the 
main problem under socialism.2 This lesson from the past equally applies today. The 
prospects for catching-up of the post-socialist CEECs with the EU economies will 
depend on their ability to generate industrial and technical change.  
The generation of industrial and technical change embodied in development and 
diffusion of new innovative products and processes requires significant institutional 
change and the scale of institutional change in CEECs is massive. However, 
institutional change cannot be judged per se, without taking into account its effects on 
technical change and growth. As argued by Kekic (1996) transition, understood as the 
institutional transformation towards a market economy, makes sense only if it is 
encompasses economic performance as well as institutional change. Institutional 
transformation towards a market economy that does not bring appreciable economic 
benefits to the population cannot be pursued indefinitely within a democratic 
framework (ibid.). 
The link between institutional change and economic recovery in CEECs is a 
controversial one. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD, 
1994, 1995, 1996) assessments of transition progress suggest that fast reformers also 
enjoy the benefits of economic recovery. On the other hand, based on the analysis of 
institutional reform over the last five years, Kekic (1996) comes to the conclusion that 
there is ‘a weak negative link between the pace and extent of economic reform and 
                                                 
2 CEECs should be interpreted as countries of central, eastern Europe and of the former Soviet Union.  Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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the depth of output decline in the transition once initial conditions and the external 
environment are taken into account’ (p. 21). Obviously, the relationship between 
long-term growth and institutional change is rather complex. This complexity arises 
from the need for the institutional set up to be conducive not only to allocative 
efficiency but also to adaptability.3 While specific institutional reform may be 
appropriate in the short-term it may be inappropriate in the long-term. For example, in 
the short term, mass privatisation may be a good solution, but it will produce a higher 
cost in terms of corporate governance problems over the long-term. Long-term 
recovery does not necessarily follow simply from progress in market reforms or, at 
least, the link is not straightforward.4 
These introductory remarks point to the complexity of the relationship between 
technical and institutional change in understanding the growth prospects of CEECs. 
The analysis of industrial and technical change should involve not only analysis of 
Science and Technology (S&T) inputs and outputs but also a quite elaborate 
institutional analysis as it is through institutions that innovation processes are 
mediated. A perspective in which technical and institutional change are explicitly 
linked is that of systems of innovation (Nelson, 1993; Lundvall, 1992; Edquist; 1997). 
Based on this perspective our argument is that long-term growth of the CEECs will 
be accompanied by the emergence of different systems of innovation (SI) (inter-firm, 
sectoral, regional, national and global).5 
                                                 
3By adaptability I mean the ability to promote technical change through diversity and co-existence of 
different organisational forms. 
4Recovery may not follow from the type of ‘shallow’ institutional change (trade liberalisation, price 
liberalisation) but may follow from ‘deeper’ institutional change (enterprise restructuring; banking 
reform; effectiveness of legal system). Economies may recover in the short-term but may fail in the 
medium- and long-term because of incompatibilities between technical and institutional change. 
5 For an overview and critique of different definitions of systems of innovation see Radosevic, 1998b. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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A systems of innovation perspective applied here to the post-socialist context has 
certain distinctive advantages when it comes to understanding the prospects for long-
term growth of the CEEs. 
First, institutional change is not seen from some external optima or static allocative 
efficiency criteria but from the point of view of how it promotes technological and 
structural change. Emerging organisational forms are judged by the way in which they 
are conducive to technical change and learning in the economy. Such a perspective 
emphasises adaptability rather than static efficiency as the main criterion in evaluating 
institutional set up. As argued by Grabher and Stark (1997), a diversity of 
organisational forms linked through exchange of resources and information allows for 
a better adaptability of the economy than a situation in which organisations are of 
only one type. Finally, the historical experience of socialist economies with their 
poverty of enterprise forms and other business organisations is the best proof of the 
relevance of this proposition. 
Second, a system of innovation perspective is, in essence, a mezzo perspective 
which goes beyond the micro/macro dichotomy. In this perspective individual firms 
are seen as part of the broader networks of firms with whom they co-operate and 
compete. Their growth is also closely connected to the available institutional sectoral 
support (see Nelson, 1997 for the role of sectoral support systems).  
However, the focus on the mezzo level does not mean that micro and macro 
(national) factors do not play a sometimes decisive role in the growth process. Firm 
specific cognitive and competence gaps result in different firm responses from the 
same set of macroeconomic incentives.6 On the other hand, national level variables 
may play such an important role that it is possible to talk about national systems of 
                                                 
6 See Swaan, 1995 for application of this in a post-socialist context. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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innovation (Freeman, 1987). While national level variables are important, it is firms’ 
diverse responses that take advantage of them.  
The SI perspective is indeterminate regarding the level at which SI operates. SI can 
be inter-firm, regional, national or global (see Edquist, 1997). What constitutes a 
mezzo perspective is the view that enterprises operate as part of a network which is a 
larger unit of analysis than the firm. Networks consist of actors (customers, 
subcontractors, infrastructure, suppliers); competencies or functions; and links or 
relationships. Competencies for technical change and growth do not reside only in 
individual firms but are distributed throughout the network of actors and their links or 
relationships.  
Third, the debate on post-socialist transformation stresses discontinuity assuming 
that market institutions can be created from scratch (Blanchard et al, 1994). In being 
historical the SI perspective accords with those views that hold that the discontinuity 
of transition from planned to market is not as large as is commonly believed. In the 
mainstream perspective all legacies of the past are seen as obstacles and deterrents to 
change. ‘Putting new institutions in place’ is seen as crucial for making transition 
successful. Contrary to this SI perspective and compatible with the evolutionary 
perspective on transition, is the view that transformation of CEECs is an open ended 
process whereby the creation of institutions is itself a process subject to economic 
laws (Rapazcynski, 1997). Legacies are seen as being dual in nature being 
simultaneously a ‘resource’ as well as a ‘constraint’ (Grabher and Stark, 1997) or a 
‘heritage’ and a ‘source of creation’ (Kontkiewicz-Chaculska and Phan, 1996). Path 
dependency combined with radical change creates an evolutionary process in which 
legacies but also novelty play a role in future outcomes.  Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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Fourth, any economic and technical change is a social process whereby new 
institutions in order to be viable have to be embodied in social practice (Granovetter, 
1985). A process of economic and technical embodiment is accompanied by creation 
and destruction or persistence of the informal networks that support or hinder change. 
Learning is not only a process of acquisition of technical and organisational 
competencies but also a process of the creation of social networks.7 These are 
indispensable for putting technical and organisational competencies into productive 
use (Kuznetsov, 1997b).8 
Based on the above four propositions I would argue that catching up by the CEECs 
is closely related to the emergence of systems of innovation be they inter-firm, 
sectoral, regional, national or global. The main concern is the transformation of the 
socialist S&T system into diverse patterns of emerging systems of innovation (SIs) in 
the post-socialist economies. The notion of a S&T system reflects well the 
institutional separation of R&D and innovation activities from production in socialism 
while the notion of SI reflects equally well the diversity of patterns of innovation 
which will develop in the post-socialist period. The basic perspective put forward is 
that in post-socialism we find a strong transformation of patterns of technical change 
(sources, knowledge base, appropriability). From one sector (the S&T system) 
innovation activities are being embedded in a multiplicity of emerging systems of 
innovation. From a sectorally uniform structure, in the sense that patterns of 
innovation, R&D organisation and sources of technical change were similar across all 
industrial sectors, the system moves towards a multiplicity of SI. Since innovation 
                                                 
7For application of social networks or social capital perspective in the context of CEECs see 
Kolankiewicz (1996). 
8Any system of innovation is characterised by a specific learning regime. This is defined by Kuznetsov 
(1997b) as the specific self-reinforcing configuration of knowledge networks (industrial districts, 
industrial groups, large firms).  Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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was separated from production and the market, the S&T system was self-contained 
making it difficult to talk about system of innovation in socialist economies. 
Diverse patterns of emerging SI are seen here as an outcome of mutual interaction 
of historical heritage, especially organisational path-dependency, recombination of 
existing competencies into new organisational forms, and radical economic change 
generated by new incentives and opportunities. 
This paper addresses two main questions. First, are there any systematic patterns in 
the process of transformation of socialist S&T systems into post-socialist systems of 
innovation? Second, what determines these patterns?  
The paper is organised in the following way. Section 2 revisits the socialist S&T 
system by pointing to its general model features as well as to its national and sectoral 
variations. The main features of socialist production/innovation networks and the 
indispensable role of informal networks in ‘getting things done’ are outlined. In the 
third part micro-, sectoral-, national- and regional determinants of the emergent 
systems of innovation in the post-socialist period are examined. Two propositions are 
developed. First, that the systems of innovation in CEECs are emerging through the 
interaction of micro-, sector-, national- and regionally- specific factors. Second, for 
the time being, micro- and sector-specific determinants are the strongest influences 
shaping the emerging systems of innovation. In Section 4 the potential network 
organisers in CEE are discussed. Among the emerging network organisers foreign 
firms are, at present, the most active, especially in central Europe. Section 5 
summarises the main conclusions. 
 
2. The socialist S&T system: the general model and its variations 
 Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
 
  8 
 
 
The multiform nature of innovative activities and their sectoral specificity are 
reflected in diverse sources of innovation as well as forms of appropriations of 
innovation rents. However, under socialism this multiplicity of patterns of innovation 
was radically reduced. Externalised R&D and engineering (R&D&E) was the main 
source of innovation in all sectors while appropriation of innovation rents was 
irrelevant as technology was essentially considered to be a ‘free good’ (Hanson and 
Pavitt, 1987). Users’ learning (‘learning by using’) and learning resulting from 
production (‘learning by doing’) were disproportionately less present as sources of 
innovation when compared to the innovation inputs from the externalised R&D 
system (supply push). This section outlines a general model of the socialist S&T 
system and its variations. This is included not just for its historical value but with a 
view to showing, first, how path-dependency comes about in the post-socialist context 
and, second, which actors, competencies and links of the old system are now being 
recombined in the transition process. 
 
2.1. General model of the socialist S&T system 
 
By abstracting much of the inter-country differences the post-socialist 
transformation in R&D and innovation (RDI) can be seen as a shift from the S&T 
system dominated by one sector (‘science and scientific services’) towards a diversity 
of sectoral systems of innovation. Under socialism most technical change was pushed 
from one institutional sector, given a different name in different countries but which 
was essentially a grouping of R&D institutes and other related activities, such as 
technology services, micro-production and support activities. This sector was 
considered as a separate branch which, through vertical links, was connected with 
industrial enterprises. This sector was involved in activities far beyond R&D Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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including design, engineering and often trouble-shooting activities. Since innovation 
and production were two quite separate activities the whole process was managed by 
government ministries and central institutes.  
R&D activities were controlled by a separate chain of command and by separate 
channels of finance from mass production (OECD, 1969, p. 425). The system was 
primarily ‘production oriented’ which influenced not only the provision of 
development facilities, but also the attitude of the industrial enterprise with regard to 
technical innovation (ibid., p. 427).  
The innovation process was organised on the basis of the linear innovation model 
with the main push coming from externalised R&D&E towards production, which 
was seen merely as the implementation of designs developed elsewhere. Production 
and users were not considered to be sources of improvements and innovations.  
For an understanding of the nature of the innovation process in socialism it is 
important to bear in mind that enterprises in the Western sense did not exist under 
socialism (von Hirschhausen, 1996). The enterprises that existed were production and 
not business units. Business functions, like marketing, finance and R&D, were either 
rudimentary and developed ‘in house’, or were entirely ‘outsourced’, either to 
ministries or to other organisations (foreign trade organisations, branch institutes, 
ministries, industry directorates). Combinates were polyfunctional units that also 
provided welfare services for the local community and in which elements of political 
control were strongly present (see von Hirschhausen, 1996). 
In market-economies technology is a firm-specific, meaning that much embodied 
knowledge is idiosyncratic, reflecting accumulated learning-by-doing and a specific 
organisational context. This essential feature of technology, not products, qualifies 
enterprises as institutions that are transforming technology into products (von Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
 
  10 
 
 
Tunzelmann, 1995). This transformation in socialism was performed across a 
hierarchy or network of applied R&D and design bureaux. Innovation tasks were 
located in branch institutes and design bureaux with very little technological effort 
being practised at the shop-floor level (OECD, 1969). The linear innovation process 
was vertically segmented while a ministerial organisation of branches introduced 
additional horizontal segmentation (Hanson and Pavitt, 1987, von Tunzelmann, 1995, 
Chapter 9). R&D was not organised as an ‘in-house’ activity, or R&D in industry, but 
as R&D for industry (Radosevic, 1998). This meant that much technological activity 
was oriented towards the needs of industry and yet was outside the enterprises. Weak 
feedback from production and use of products as well as the diffusion of 
transformation of technology into products across the hierarchy deprived enterprises 
of the ability to accumulate knowledge. Knowledge was accumulated more in design 
and engineering institutes, which acted as problem solvers, often on a daily basis, for 
enterprises.  
The S&T system was very much branch oriented as confirmed by the extent of 
intersectoral flows of innovation which were very modest. Table 1 indicates the extent 
to which technology flows were enclosed within individual sectors. Branch 
orientation of the S&T system was reinforced further by inter-departmental barriers to 
co-ordination of R&D. However, the administrative barriers between the R&D system 
and industrial production were reinforced by the system of planning and led to the 
reluctance of the factory to innovate. 
 
   Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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Table 1: Intersectoral movements of Soviet inventions (Percentage of number of 
inventions used inside the same sector) 
 
Sector  1973-74  1981 
Civil Machine building  0.56  0.68 
Closed Civil machinery building  1  - 
Construction  0.63  0.56 
Defence industry  0.83  0.73 
Light and food industry  0.77  0.73 
Other  0.51  0.79 
Other civil. heavy industry  0.69  0.69 
Power Gen. and Transmission  0.7  0.4 
Transport  0.6  0.74 
Education and Science  0.17  0.52 
 
Source: Recalculated based on Martens, John (1991) 
 
 
In summary, in socialism transformation of technology into products, was dispersed 
across a hierarchy. Enterprises were merely production units and thus not fully 
developed knowledge accumulating institutions. The separation of technology 
development from production meant that innovation infrastructure institutions played 
a much more important role in the creation of technology and the main systemic 
defect was in the weak technology creation capability of enterprises. As technology is 
primarily a firm-specific asset the consequence of this systemic defect was that the 
links between R&D and production were generally weak. However, functional one-
way links running from R&D to production were more intensive. In some cases they 
led, as will be argued in the next section, to quite close relationships between 
R&D&E organisations and enterprises, despite formal barriers.  
Second, these were links only in investments and in solving major production 
bottlenecks but not in continuous improvements. This was the result of production not 
being seen as an innovative activity and the fulfilment of planing tasks hindered the 
resolution of all the complications that innovation would bring. Enterprises, which 
were treated as organisations that only implemented designs created elsewhere, could Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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not be regarded as a source of demand pull for innovation. In addition, the closed 
character of most socialist economies induced much ‘reinventing-the-wheel’ type 
technology effort and deprived the economy of the numerous growth possibilities that 
openness can provide through foreign direct investment (FDI), subcontracting, and 
alliances. 
 
2.2. Variations within the general model of the socialist S&T system 
 
The general model of the socialist S&T system outlined above describes the 
essential features of innovation activities in socialist economies but does not reflect 
significant sectoral and national differences or differences over time in socialist S&T 
systems. The argument here is that these differences were important and that they 
strongly influenced modes of adjustments as well as the scale of problems in 
transformation of S&T in individual CEECs. 
 
2.2.1. National differences 
National differences between S&T systems of socialist countries were most 
pronounced in the following respects: 
 
  in the degree to which R&D activities were carried out within industrial enterprises 
(share of ‘in-house’ R&D); 
  in the degree to which R&D was carried out in extra-mural organisations (share of 
industrial institutes); 
  in the degree to which universities played a teaching vs. research role (share of 
higher education institutions in gross expenditures for R&D); Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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  in the degree to which the role and functions of Academies of Sciences were 
different (Academies of Sciences as government bodies or loose associations of 
institutes);9 
  in the degree to which economies were open or closed for S&T co-operation 
(CMEA membership and progress in socialist economic reforms);  
 
These differences taken together indicate the degree to which countries were close 
to the Soviet R&D model (see Gokhberg, 1997). It is beyond the scope of this paper 
to delve in greater detail into these differences. Table 2 indicates the most important 
national difference - the degree to which R&D activities were extra- or intra-mural - 
through the institutional structure of the foreign US patent data. 
 
Table 2: Number of the foreign US patents by institutional sectors, 1969-1994 (%) 
 
  Former  Bulgaria  Former  Hungary  Romania  Poland  Former 
  Sov Un    Czecho-        Yugoslavia 
      slovakia 
Acad. of Science.  15  4  27  3  0  7  3 
Enterprises  11  49  41  81  25  24  62 
Industrial inst.  56  40  25  12  50  37  6 
Government  0  3  0  0  19  0  0 
Universities  5  0  4  2  5  24  1 
Foreign  12  4  1  2  1  8  28 
Non-classified  0  0  1  0  0  0  0 
 
Source: Radosevic and Kutlaca (1999) 
 
 
Table 2 indicates four groups of countries with respect to the share of enterprises vs. 
extra-mural organisations in US patenting. Hungary and former-Yugoslavia had by 
far the highest share of enterprise patenting. Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia had patents 
both from enterprises and industrial institutes while Polish and Romanian patenting 
was dominated by extra-mural patenting. The most Soviet like model in terms of 
                                                 
9For national differences in the role of and functions of Academies of Sciences see Balazs (1997). Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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patenting can be found in the Soviet Union itself where enterprises were marginal 
players.10 
 
2.2.2. Sectoral differences in innovation activities 
There were also substantial variations between industries in the organisation of 
R&D. As argued by the OECD (1969) study on the Soviet S&T some industries 
conformed almost entirely to the standard pattern of the socialist R&D-production 
chain while the others departed from it. The biggest difference was between priority 
(defence, aerospace) and civil sectors. 
 
Priority sectors In priority sectors the defects of the system were overcome not 
through a different organisational model but through effective central co-ordination, 
control, flexibility in planning, and government authority in enforcing priorities which 
were combined with a much more generous supply of development and experimental 
production facilities than was the case in civil sectors. Effective co-ordination led to 
the overcoming of inter-departmental or intra-departmental barriers while government 
authority removed the inhibitions usually placed on innovation by production-oriented 
planning (OECD, 1969). In addition, the defence sector’s single powerful customer 
(Ministry of Defence) was able to explicitly dictate technical and economic 
requirements and develop close co-operation with the military industry (Amman and 
Cooper, 1982: 353).  
Priority sectors show that formal networks were functioning despite obvious 
systemic weaknesses. However, how these systemic defects could be overcome in 
                                                 
10For analysis of the CEE US foreign patenting see Radosevic and Kutlaca (1999). Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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non-priority, civil sectors is less clear. The argument here, which draws on the works 
of Russian scholars, is that this was possible only through informal links.  
 
Differences between civil sectors Explanations for the sectoral differences in 
organisation of R&D among civil sectors are not straightforward. The authoritative 
OECD (1969) study, which also tried to analyse sectoral differences, indicates that 
these differences were determined by: technological, historical and organisational 
factors. In areas where it was difficult to transform the experimental model into a 
prototype, for example electronics, the R&D pattern was more traditional. Historical 
and specific circumstances in which particular arrangements grew up, also played an 
important role, especially that of powerful and entrepreneurial individuals. 
Organisational factors were taken into consideration when a process was used in a 
wide variety of enterprises. Organisational complexity, as well as economies of scale, 
shifted the responsibility for development to a major research institute.  
Based on the OECD (1969) study it is possible to distinguish between three sectoral 
variants of the general pattern of R&D and innovation organisation: the traditional, 
the combined and the factory based pattern. 
Figure 1 Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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The traditional pattern is the one in which the research institute might handle the 
whole of a project from the research stage to the industrial prototype stage. In the 
combined pattern research is centralised but design and development are 
decentralised. The factory based pattern was present on a limited scale. Some design 
bureaux, in spite of their independent status, in practice simply worked as if they were 
design bureaux of the factories to which they are attached. At the same time the 
factories themselves were responsible for a considerable amount of original design 
and development work. 
Although figure 1 indicates the existence of the three distinctive patterns it is not 
possible to draw too much out of these differences due to two factors. First, as 
concluded by the OECD (1969) in the vast majority sectors the dominant pattern was 
the traditional one. Second, this by itself does not mean that the organisational 
variation was either a disadvantage or an advantage. Individuals that were able to 
mobilise strong support could compensate for the disadvantages of formal 
organisations by bringing together all the actors in a joint operation. For example, 
although R&D and innovation in the iron and steel industry was organised along the 
traditional pattern its US patenting record is much better than that for other sectors 
(see Radosevic and Kutlaca, 1999). 
 
2.2.3. Combinates: building horizontal structures 
A third element of variations in the general model of the socialist S&T system is the 
changes in the system itself over time. Indeed, the socialist system was under 
permanent reform although most analysts from that period agreed that very little real 
change actually occurred.  Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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The chief benefits from these groupings of enterprises were in the streamlining of 
the planning system by a reduction in the number of units to be controlled, economies 
of scale, and encouragement given to innovation. On the other hand, these 
organisational structures were the result of the deficiencies of the centralised system 
and an unwillingness to adopt a fully decentralised system. This allowed the reduction 
in the number of units to be centrally directed and allowed ministries to concentrate 
on ‘strategic’ tasks. Vertical integration allowed incorporation of the most important 
supplier enterprises, with the aim of improving the acute supply problems. 
From an innovation perspective, the introduction of horizontal amalgamations of 
enterprises, here termed combinates but given different names in different countries 
(see table 3), was a very important institutional innovation.11 Combinates enabled 
closer links between enterprises and R&D by avoiding to a certain extent central co-
ordination.  
 
                                                 
11Chandler (1993) describes them ‘as the most significant institutional innovation in the 
microenvironment of the USSR after Stalin put the central planning system into operation’ (p. 333) Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
 
Table 3: Horizontal groupings of enterprises in the socialist period in the CEE countries 
 
Country  Organisational forms  Year of  Description 
    Introd. 
USSR  Production associations (proizvodstvennoe  1973  In 1984 they accounted for about half of both industrial output and  
  obedineniye)    employment 
  Science - production associations (NPO)  
  Industrial (administrative) associations       
DDR  Combinates  1969  Decree of 1979 set up combines as the basic production unit. In  
      1981 there was 133 combinates with an average 25 employees and  
      20-40 enterprises.   
Czechoslovakia  Industrial associations (VHJ)  1958  In mid-1970s VJH became the basic production unit. ‘It usually  
      involved a horizontal integration of enterprises, either a koncern (a  
      large enterprise alone or one linked with smaller ones) or a trust  
      (where enterprises of comparable size are merged), but there was  
      also the vertically integrated kombinat’ (Jeffries, 1993: 248).   
Romania  A country-wide horizontal integration of one large  1969   Very strong centralization where the central was responsible for 
  enterprise with smaller ones (centrala)    imposing disaggregated plan targets on constituent enterprises.   
Poland  Large economic organisation (wielkie organizacje  1973  From 1973-76 WGO enjoyed high degree of independence followed  
  gospodarcze, WGO)    by recentralization after 1976   
Bulgaria  State economic organisations (durzhavenski  1963  In 1970 the number of DSO reduced from 120 to 64 (35 in industry) 
  stopanski obedinenniya, DSO)    In 1980/81 the initiation of small state-owned, semi-autonomous  
      enterprises within DSO began.   
Hungary  Large state enterprises were members of trusts  -  After 1968 most state enterprises were freed from compulsory  
  or associations     membership of trusts and associations. In 1982 ‘private workshop  
      partnerships’ were allowed in state enterprises. 
 
Source: based on Jeffries (1993), Grabher (1997), McDermott (1997), Smith (1981) Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
 
As von Hirschhausen (1996, p. 85-88) concludes, horizontal integration which 
became possible within combinates (often the whole branch was integrated) especially 
in Czechoslovakia, led to the attachment of a number of R&D organisations to one 
combinate. However, the creation of these monopolies and the diminution of cross-
branch co-operation and confusion in relations between enterprise and combine or 
central company had adverse effects on innovation.  
 
2.2.4. Weak and strong links and informal networks in socialism 
It has been pointed out that the creation of technology and transformation of 
technology into products was, in socialism, distributed across socialist hierarchies. As 
different business functions were ‘outsourced’ to different organisations the operation 
of the system was dependent on all the actors involved. Actors were linked through 
hierarchical relationships which were often very complex. The previous sections have 
illustrated the diversity of these links in terms of R&D - production. However, despite 
this diversity there were some common systemic features regarding the strength of 
links within these hierarchies. 
The weak links were:  
 
  those between different ministries or different branches (see table 1);  
  those between foreign sellers and domestic users;  
  lack of feedback from user enterprise to R&D and design institutes. 
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However, there were functional one way links between R&D and design institutes. 
In such a situation the biggest problem was the system integration at product level, 
and process (network) integration at enterprise level.12 
By system integration at product level we mean that production and continuous 
improvement require integration of different functions (finance, R&D, engineering, 
procurement, production, sale) whose integration is essential to innovation dynamics.  
By process integration at the firm level we mean that production and innovation has 
to be organised across several tiers of suppliers which are all involved to different 
degrees, not only in production, but also in innovation.  
In market economies these integrative functions are carried out by producers or 
users. In the socialist period it was officially government administration or, in 
practice, central or design institutes that were taking on some of the functions of a 
network organiser. There was some system integration capability in institutes, but 
only for products not for processes. Design institutes also had much better 
international links and a better understanding of technological trends, the possibilities 
for domestic industry and even markets (see Alange et al, 1995 for the case of the 
Russian machine tools sector). Since users did not initiate work the most important 
actors were design institutes, except in the case of the defence sector where the 
Ministry of Defence was a competent user and initiated new developments. 
Customers or users were not strong initiators of change. Even when they had the 
money to make their own contracts in R&D (especially in the 1980s) they were not 
very concerned about the final results. 
System integrators at the process level were ministries. Organisation of processes 
that involved multi-technology products was especially difficult if not impossible as 
                                                 
12As business press indicate this is one of the biggest weaknesses of enterprises in post-socialist period. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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this could involve several ministries. Sometimes this led to several parallel 
developments that resulted in a sort of rivalry. 
 
Foreign supplier - domestic user links Links between domestic users and producers 
were weak in the socialist economy. Since the producer was not actually in control of 
all the elements of production (design, price, distribution) the whole idea of learning 
by using (von Hippel, 1990) was, except in the defence sector, alien to the socialist 
economy. However, export and import were the points where domestic organisations 
could be exposed to some learning by importing effects. Sandberg (1989) shows that 
the Soviets tried to overcome their generally very poor learning-by-assimilating 
capability by creating close and long-term collaboration with a selected group of 
accredited Western suppliers that could help them not only with technical pre-
investment adaptations, but also in reaching capacity levels and providing for further 
diffusion.13 However, the effects of this were seriously constrained in the more closed 
Soviet type economies where contact between foreign and domestic sellers was 
mediated through foreign trade organisations (FTOs) (see figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: 
 
 
Relationship between foreign and domestic partners in 'classic' Soviet system
Foreign supplier/ buyer  <<<>>>> FTO <<<<>>>> Ministry <<<>>> Factory
 
 
 
Initially, FTOs were responsible for handling all foreign trade contracts. Foreign 
companies were not allowed to have contact with other departments within the 
                                                 
13The more advanced Soviet industries were, the more successfully they learned from this collaboration 
(Sandberg, 1989). Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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Ministry or with the factories. As Sandberg (1989) shows, long-term relationships 
between FTO and foreign suppliers were crucial for successful business partnering. 
The process of the transformation of this system into a more direct relationship was 
gradual. First, Soviet ministries started to lose the monopoly in their particular field of 
activity to the advantage of republic ministries. Then republic ministries started to 
bypass Soviet FTOs and to undertake trade negotiations on their own. From 1988 
direct contacts between foreign suppliers and domestic factories have been allowed in 
the USSR. By a decree in 1988 foreign firms were permitted to do business directly 
with Soviet producers without having to go through an FTO. (On this point see Wit 
and Monami, 1993, and Salmi and Moller, 1993.) 
In all the other CEE countries, with the exception of Romania, direct trading had 
been allowed for a long-time and Jeffries (1993: 247) reports that in Czechoslovakia, 
even after the 1968 invasion, some enterprises were able to continue direct trading 
with foreign partners. This, for example in Hungary, led to the strongly dichotomised 
treatment of eastern and western markets by domestic producers (see Hare and Oakey, 
1993 on process machinery). Selling in ‘soft’ eastern markets probably led to fewer 
inputs in terms of learning by exporting. Factories were involved, through FTOs, in 
the technical negotiations while FTOs were responsible for the financial aspects of 
negotiations and to a great extent led the organisation of the entire import or export 
process. 
 
2.2.4.1. ‘Getting things done’: informal networks in socialism 
Trying to understand how the socialist system operated by looking only at the 
formal organisational structures would be highly misleading. It would be like 
attempting to understand how the market economy operates by reading orthodox Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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economics text books. In the socialist economies informal networks played a key role 
in ‘getting things done’. They were essential in compensating for chronic shortages of 
raw materials, spare parts and equipment. The pervasiveness of bargaining and 
interpretation of centrally planned systems as bargaining economies arises from 
reciprocal and asymmetrical relations in hierarchies.14 
To cope with this problem in such a system it was necessary to have an institution: 
an informal network capable of negotiating relevant exchange proportions (how much 
will be done and what will be received in exchange). (See on this Kuznetsov, 1994). 
The role of informal networks was given attention by some Russian economists. For 
example, Gaidar (1990, chapter 2) argues that in the USSR investments were not 
directed to bottlenecks and to areas of the most acute shortages. Rather investment 
allocation was the function of the interest group and bargaining which was not 
directly linked to the shortages in the services it provided. Kuznetsov (1994) points 
out that what was most important was the support of all the parties on which the 
completion of the investment process depended: construction agencies, ministries 
providing equipment and other necessary inputs, and local authorities where the 
project was to be physically located (p. 11). The withdrawal of such support would 
bring investment projects to a halt no matter what the central planner’s intentions. In 
such a situation things could be achieved only with the consent of all the parties 
involved. Similarly, in the case of Czechoslovakia, Klaus and Kezek (as quoted by 
Jeffries, 1993: 250) show that large, monopolistic enterprises used their superior 
information to ‘dictate’ plans to the central authorities. Mlcoh (1993, as quoted by 
Kenway, 1994), also discussing Czechoslovakia, argues that ‘distortion of planning 
information is not done against the superior body (by providing incomplete 
                                                 
14 For this approach in the analysis of socialist economies see Aven, 1992, and Chavance, 1995. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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information) but in agreement with it; the planning game is a co-operative game’ 
(emphasis as in original, p.24). 
Since formal contractual obligations were prone to failure industrial managers had 
to develop the ability to ‘get things done’. Managers were faced with a diversity of 
technological and organisational challenges and the way to cope with these challenges 
was to establish their own social network. Most often the costs of establishing such 
networks were not trivial and this contributes to explaining the pervasive problems in 
‘introducing’ (vnedrenyie) new technologies into production. Probably only in the 
case of large scale projects, in which several parties could see that it would be in their 
interests, did it make sense to incur the costs of the creation of informal networks. 
This feature of the centrally planned system was noted long ago in the OECD 
(1969) study which stated that ‘in some industries the smooth passage of innovation 
cannot be entirely explained in terms of special organisational arrangements or the 
direct intervention of the government at the highest levels as in the defence and 
aerospace industry’. Often organisational problems were overcome through the 
informal and apparently highly successful initiatives of individuals and organisations.  
On the technical side, informal compensatory mechanisms (barter) complemented 
the formalised function of the maintenance, tool, and machine building departments 
within the enterprises in order to avoid risks of shortages and reduce dependence on 
informal networks. Grabher (1997: 109) reports that ‘in the late 1980s these 
departments for which the GDR authorities had invented the term 
Rationiliserungsmittelbau, provided roughly 25% of all investments in equipment and 
employed more than 70,000 workers (...)possessing an extraordinarily level of craft 
skills and “chaos qualification” (...), that is rich experience in the development of ad 
hoc solutions.’ These, what Grabher (1997) terms, ‘chaos related skills’ were essential Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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to achieving production targets. Whether they were those skills that can be easily 
employed in a market economy or whether they are basically irrelevant is an issue for 
discussion (see on this Pavitt, 1997). 
 
3. Emergent systems of innovation in post-socialism: micro, sectoral, national 
and regional determinants 
 
Section 2 highlights one conclusion which is of relevance for this section which 
looks at factors that determine the emergence of systems of innovation (SI) in the 
post-socialist period in CEE. By extending the understanding of SI as a network 
consisting of actors and their links, in which competencies are employed, it can be 
concluded that in the socialist economy it was the actors and not the links per se that 
were the main problem.  
The central actor of SI - enterprise - was merely a production, not a business 
organisation, with ‘dislocated’ finance, marketing, R&D and often engineering 
functions. The reconstruction of enterprises is the central issue in the reconstruction of 
SIs in CEECs.  
While socialist links were constructed and managed by government authorities after 
socialism new links had to be constructed and managed by enterprises. Although 
enterprises are the central actors in systems of innovation they do not operate as 
isolated entities. Their activities are shaped by national, sectoral and regional factors. 
Equally, enterprises themselves upgrade national, regional and sectoral factors of 
growth and competitiveness. The proposition in this paper is that systems of 
innovation emerge as a result of a mutual interaction between micro-, sectoral-, 
national- and regionally-specific factors and determinants. In figure 3 presents a Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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conceptual framework in graphic form which illustrates the main argument in this 
section.  
 
 
 
The relative significance of each determinant varies with each case. The emergent 
systems of innovation are shaped through the interaction of all four levels. As a result, 
the basic feature of the model is indeterminacy of systems of innovation, i.e. system 
of innovation can emerge at any of the four levels depending on the strength of 
specific determinants. In this section this model is applied to the post-socialist CEE 
and each of the determinants of systems of innovation and their elements are 
examined. 
 
3.1. Micro-specific determinants of systems of innovation: actors, linkages and 
competencies 
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The emergence of SI in post-socialist economies evolves around the reconstruction 
of enterprises as the main actors, their links with other enterprises and public / private 
organisations, and competencies (functions) that are employed in the process of 
production and technical change (Alange et al, 1995). This section tries to show that 
in turbulent post-socialist environment these micro-level factors have the most 
immediate and the strongest effects on the (non)emergence of SI. As a result, it would 
be expected that the systems of innovation are still very much confined to individual 
enterprises or groupings of firms be they MNCs or domestic business groups. 
 
 Actors: enterprises and networks  
 
Post-socialist transformation is primarily change in the main actors of economic 
process. It is a change towards the reconstitution of enterprises as the main agents of 
industrial change as well as in the character of networks in which enterprises are 
embodied. 
The transformation of SI in CEECs will be shaped by the way integration of 
functions at the firm level develop. As von Tunzelmann (1995: 10) points out ‘by 
endogenously changing their circumstances through technological accumulation, 
firms may ultimately alter the national system itself’. New SI will be strongly shaped 
by the way enterprises develop their business functions. Enterprises which were 
previously only production units are developing previously ‘dislocated’ functions like 
finance, marketing, organisation and R&D. For example, the degree to which the 
finance of enterprises depends on holding companies, banks, stock markets or on the 
state will strongly determine the profile of the national system of innovation and its 
dynamics. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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Because during socialism, the notion of the firm as a business entity was 
meaningless one would expect a large scale redefinition of enterprises and their 
boundaries. They are determined by the type of privatisation and can be modified 
through subsequent ownership changes. However, irrespective of the type of 
privatisation it seems that the common feature of enterprise organisations in CEECs is 
extensive cross-ownership between enterprises or between banks and investment 
funds over enterprises, or bank or enterprise-led financial-industrial groups. 
An extensive presence of these mezzo institutions indicates, as argued by Grabher 
and Stark (1997), that the actual economic unit in post-socialism is not the isolated 
firm but the networks that link the firms and connect personnel across them. Networks 
are not only the units of restructuring but are also the agents of restructuring. These 
networks are country specific. They are groupings of enterprises linked either through 
inter-enterprise cross-ownership links (Hungary), through banks and investment funds 
(Czech R.) or through a mixture of these two (Russian financial - industrial groups).  
 
Links or relationships 
 
In the socialist S&T system, creation of technology was not linked to production 
and the economy was isolated from the world economy. The post-socialist departure 
from this initial state can be seen as a functional recombination or reconfiguration 
between enterprises and innovation infrastructure and between foreign and domestic 
enterprises (see Radosevic, 1998). For example, previously externalised engineering 
activities are becoming part of enterprises activities; in subcontracting relationships 
foreign enterprises are effectively substituting for the marketing function of domestic 
enterprises. However, this is not a simple recombination with unchanged dynamic Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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properties; it is a restructuring in which functional recombination shapes the patterns 
and dynamics of technological accumulation.15 A good example of this ‘recombinant 
innovation model’ is the transformation of the Chinese electronics industry.16 
Socialist enterprises had to internalise diverse functions because of the extremely 
poor quality of the local subcontracting services and materials suppliers. As Hare and 
Oakey (1993) show, the significant shortages and the poor quality of inputs to the 
production process explain in large part the behaviour patterns regarding input and 
output linkages. As there were no alternative suppliers in the centrally planned 
system, links were confined to a few enterprises and were one-directional (from R&D 
institutes to user firms; from foreign suppliers to domestic actors). These links were 
around investment projects and not about continuous improvements (Bell, 1997). 
There were no feedback loops between the supplier of a good or service and the 
consumer.  
Links now may become two directional. Learning inputs from users can be fed into 
the technology innovation process of producers. Although users are now playing an 
important role, for learning to occur a critical level of demand for technology by users 
is a precondition. At the moment, this demand exists only in a very few sectors. One 
good example is the demand from banks for IT which has led to the development of 
this particular domestic software segment (Bitzer, 1997). In opening up the economy, 
learning inputs from foreign partners through different forms of foreign direct 
investment, alliances and subcontracting are becoming essential. Foreign partners 
                                                 
15A phenomenon that recombination of existing competencies in economy may create much more 
innovation dynamics is conceptually developed by David and Foray (1994). They show that 
institutional arrangements exert strong influence on knowledge distribution and that innovation is 
developed through recombination of the existing knowledge, i.e. innovation is a function of knowledge 
distribution. 
16 See on this analysis by Shulin and Steinmueller, 1996. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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operate as the main source of technological innovation, especially organisational, 
leading to high productivity improvements in foreign investment enterprises.17 
 
Functions and competencies  
 
The reconstitution of enterprises and the reconstitution of links with domestic and 
foreign partners bring significant transformation to competencies and a redistribution 
of competencies between enterprises and innovation infrastructure. A change in the 
techno-economic profile of enterprises is the change of focus from the mastery of 
production know-how to non-tangible and non-technological assets like management. 
This reconstitution of enterprises and their links in post-socialism has revealed:  
 
  a lack of marketing skills, finance, organisation; 
  a lack of product system integration capabilities; 
  a lack of network building capabilities at firm level; 
 
However, production capabilities, including in particular engineering and workers’ 
skills, are often shown to be higher than might be expected. 
As business press evidence shows, presently the biggest problem for foreign 
companies is to find network organisers at firm level and system integrators at 
product level. Companies that are able to integrate the system at product level 
(combining foreign with domestic solutions, customisation, etc.), and organise 
networks at firm level (manage domestic subcontractors) are in a much better 
position when entering into alliances. Those able to acquire strategic assets like 
                                                 
17 For evidence on productivity levels see Hunya, 1996a,b. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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distribution systems and supplier networks will basically shape the industrial 
structure in the future. 
In the early phases of post-socialist transformation, restructuring patterns are 
determined by the value of the ‘localised’ learning processes inherited from the 
closed economy in the new, open and capitalist environment and by the state of 
demand. A market value of inherited technological capabilities strongly 
influences the prospects for enterprise and knowledge base restructuring as well 
as determining the prospects for involvement of foreign strategic partners. One of 
complexities of the post-socialist transformation is that the immediate market 
value of many of the inherited competencies is low as either their outputs are not 
geared to users’ needs or else significant further development is needed. This 
explains the rather mixed effects of commercialisation of, for example, Russian 
technologies developed within the defence complex (see on this Bernstein, 1997, 
and Sedaitis, 1997). Where products or capabilities on which these are based are 
of high quality and are user friendly they usually attract restructuring agents be 
they domestic entrepreneurs or foreign investors. 
In summary, the reconstruction of enterprises, the extent of their linkages to 
other enterprises and organisations, and the profile of inherited firm-
competencies strongly determines the (non)emergence of SI in CEE. Table 4 
summarises the results of several industry studies in five sectors in CEE and 
interprets their results through an actors, linkages, competencies framework.  
 Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
 
Table 4: Changing actors, linkages and competencies in central Europe 
  Dominant actors  Production / technology 
links 
Competencies employed  Overall pattern 
Computers  
(Havas, 1998, 
Kubielas, 1998, Bitzer, 
1997b) 
Electronic conglomerates and small 
co-operatives in the ‘80s have been 
replaced by SMFs and foreign 
investors 
Subcontracting and 
foreign investment type 
links 
Low (subcontracting) and 
high end of competence 
spectrum (design) 
Old networks wiped out. 
Domestic PC assemblers 
are strongly present. 
Higher computer 
segments are foreign led. 
Software 
(Bitzer, 1997, 
Kubielas, 1998, 
Bernstein, 1997) 
 
Software as only in house activity of 
R&D institutes and large 
combinates is being transformed 
into independent sector populated 
by domestic SMEs. 
Strong links with 
domestic users and 
foreign suppliers through 
alliances (ICAs)+ few 
export niches houses18 
Maintenance and 
customisation and 
emerging system 
integration skills 
Newly emerging 
innovation networks 
based on alliances 
between domestic and 
foreign SW firms. 
Telecom equipment 
(Mueller, 1998, 
Hirschhausen, 1996c, 
Constantellou, 1997, 
Kubielas, 1998) 
State run enterprises are now being 
taken over by foreign owners 
Strong links with 
domestic users and 
foreign parent companies. 
Adaptation of generic 
solutions to domestic 
networks 
Domestic networks are 
being replaced by foreign 
network organisers. 
Car assembly 
(Havas, 1997) 
Vertically integrated combinates are 
being replaced by foreign owned - 
greyfield or greenfield - investors  
Integration into foreign 
investors sourcing 
networks at still low 
levels of integration 
Production and 
engineering 
skills 
Domestic networks are 
being replaced by foreign 
network organiser 
Shipbuilding 
(Bitzer and von 
Hirschhausen, 1997) 
Domestically controlled shipyards  Strong links with foreign 
partners through alliances 
Process engineering and 
design in low-end 
segments 
Domestic network 
organisers 
ICA = international co-operative agreements 
                                                 
18Examples are: ParaGraph and Graphisfot in Hungary, Olympus in Poland, Intel and Sun Microsystems in Russia. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
 
 
The outline of changes in these five industries indicates the significant extent to 
which changes have occurred in terms of actors, links and competencies employed.  
As a result, the main players are now foreign companies and hence links with them 
are essential for domestic enterprises. In the past, the essential link for innovation was 
that with domestic R&D institutions, a link which is now being broken. However, the 
changes in actors, competencies and links are not strong in all sectors. Examples of 
the CEE steel industry (CERNA, 1996), the Romanian metallurgy sector (Bell, 1997) 
and Russian aviation industry (Vorobjev, 1996, Shaw, 1996) show that not much has 
changed in terms of links.  
Changing actors, linkages, and competencies generates diversity in the sectoral 
patterns of innovation through an increased diversity of sources of technical change 
(users, foreign partners) as well as appropriability mechanisms (IPR, lead time, 
cumulated know-how, etc.). This diversity of sectoral patterns is not only the outcome 
of opening but also of the diversity of inherited competencies.19 The specificity of 
CEE is the variety of competencies or technology positions which domestic 
enterprises occupy in different international networks.20 For example, in the software 
sector three technologically different positions of the CEE producers can be found: 
 
  adaptation of foreign proprietary software 
  contracting software development, maintenance and translation to new languages a 
la India 
  development of proprietary software through sophisticated niche software 
exporters. 
                                                 
19 For evidence on several Russian sectors see Bernstein, 1997. 
20 For more evidence on this see Radosevic, 1997c. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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This diversity is not only an intra-sectoral feature but can even be found to be an 
intra-firm feature. Havas (1998) and Szalavetz (1997) cite the example of Videoton, 
the Hungarian electronic ex-combinate, that is integrated into international production 
networks in very diverse ways ranging from subcontracting in electronics in the 
manner of east Asia some years ago (Hobday, 1994), to carrying out of joint R&D 
with foreign partners. 
 
3.2. Sectoral determinants of systems of innovation; markets, technology and 
finance 
 
Sectors as organisational frameworks for innovation activities have lost the 
importance and meaning that they had previously in the socialist economy. Newly 
formed conglomerates and holdings are mainly inter-sectoral.21 However, sector 
specific determinants expressed through technology, finance and market requirements 
represent an important constraining or enabling factor in shaping innovation systems 
in CEECs.  
In table 5 the basic patterns of restructuring in six industries in CEE are summarised 
by pointing to demand (market), finance and technology as the main structural 
determinants in this process. All six industry studies suggest that the market demand 
is essential for the restructuring process. In those sectors or subsectors where domestic 
demand is growing it is more likely that progress in industrial modernisation will take 
place. However, restructuring will not occur as a result of increased demand which 
                                                 
21Only in Russia the officially registered FIGs are organised along sectoral lines. However, informal 
FIGs are much more inter-sectoral. See several issues of Russian business journal ‘Expert’ on these 
groups. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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could be met by import. Sectoral studies suggest that the shape and pace of the 
restructuring process are also determined by technology and finance gaps. If both 
finance and technology gaps are small, as is the case in PC assembly, customized 
software and - partly - in the food processing industry, it might be expected that the 
domestic-led restructuring would take place. Indeed, these sectors are growing in all 
CEECs, including Russia. If, on the other hand, the technology gap and/or finance are 
a problem, then problems can be expected in modernisation. This may lead to 
significant country differences. In telecommunication services, where the gap in 
finance and technology is the greatest, this problem has been often resolved in CEE 
by the surrendering of control over the modernization process to foreign investors. 
Similar trends can be observed in car assembly. In shipbuilding, where the technology 
gap in low-end segments was not a major issue, domestic finance enabled successful 
domestic control of the modernization process in Poland (Bitzer, and von 
Hirschhausen, 1997). In higher-end computer segments (workstations and 
mainframes) where technology is highly proprietary, where domestic demand is not 
growing and where finance requirements are high the ex-socialist producers have 
closed down in all CEECs (Bitzer, 1998)). Moreover, in the face of weak domestic 
demand in the higher segments and a lack of competitive advantages for sourcing 
production in these segments, foreign investors have not yet entered on any large 
scale. It is only recently in Hungary that a spread of foreign investments in electronics 
can be seen. 
The emphasis on market, technology and finance does not mean that these factors 
are the only determinants of the restructuring. For example, in PC assembly sector in 
all CEECs domestic producers have a strong presence but their market shares differ 
significantly. In the automobile industry we find that similar factor endowments in Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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terms of markets, finance and technology have led to different modernization patterns 
even within one country. For example, in the cases of Skoda and Tatra in the Czech 
Republic. Whether similar structural situations will result in similar outcomes depends 
on micro-specific factors, including management capabilities, and on national factors, 
in particular political control of the privatization process. In all six industries market, 
technology and finance gaps are significant structural factors of modernisation. 
However, they alone cannot determine the final outcomes of modernization for a 
variety of other micro and macro factors. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
 
 
Table 5: Determinants of systems of innovation at sectoral level in CEECs: markets, finance and technology 
  Car industry  Shipbuilding  Food processing  Software  Telecoms  Computers 
Markets 
(demand) 
Growing domestic demand 
Proximity to EU markets 
Large scale orders are 
critical 
Growing domestic 
demand for 
differentiated 
products; Problems in 
accessing foreign 
market 
Growing domestic 
market; 
 
 
 
Growing domestic 
market but with big 
differences in terms of 
effective investment 
demand 
Growing domestic 
demand for PCs; 
Weak demand for 
workstations and 
mainframes 
Finance  Lacking finance  Solving the issues of 
debts and external 
funding is critical; 
Financial restructuring 
required. 
Relatively low finance 
requirements; 
Possibility to raise 
domestic finance. 
No large finance 
required for 
customized SW; 
Finance as a problem 
in complex projects 
and standardized SW 
Large finance 
requirement 
Low finance 
requirements in PCs; 
Large finance 
requirements in higher 
segments 
Technology  Lacking product 
engineering know-how;  
Weak organisational 
capabilities for 
restructuring supplier 
networks 
Easier access to 
technology in low-end 
segments; 
ICA important for 
accessing technology 
Technology is 
accessible; Integration 
of different 
technologies requires 
organisational 
capabilities 
Technology accessible 
through ICA; 
Competitive 
advantages of 
domestic firms in 
customized SW; 
Technology gap in 
standardized SW 
Huge technology gap 
in telecom equipment 
Accessible technology 
and components in PC 
assembly; Huge 
technology gap in 
higher segments 
 
Overall pattern  Lacking finance and 
product engineering gap 
accompanied by small 
domestic markets leads to 
restructuring by foreign 
assemblers in central 
Europe 
Given the available 
external funding and 
easier access to 
technology the 
restructuring process 
depends on the large 
scale orders - foreign 
or domestic 
Lower finance gaps 
and easier access to 
technology allowed 
domestic - led 
restructuring which is 
accompanied by 
foreign-led 
restructuring in 
differentiated products 
Growing domestic 
market, low finance 
requirements and 
access to technology 
via ICAs enabled a 
visible presence of 
domestic firms in 
customized SW 
Growing domestic 
market but huge 
finance and 
technology gap led to 
a strong presence of 
foreign network 
organisers 
Growing domestic 
market, low finance 
requirements and 
access to components 
from world market 
enabled a visible 
presence of domestic 
PC assemblers 
Note: ICA - international co-operative agreements; SW - software; Source: Based on Richet and Bourrasa (1998), Bitzer and Hirschhausen (1998), Charpiot-Michaud (1998), 
Bitzer (1998), Mueller (1998) and Bitzer (1998b). Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
 
 
 
3.3. National determinants of emergent systems of innovation 
 
The literature on national systems of innovation demonstrates the strong role of 
national factors in determining the basic features of the technology accumulation 
process (Freeman, 1987; Nelson and Rosenberg, 1992; Lundvall et al, 1992). 
However, as argued by Nelson (1997), it is a mistake to ask whether it is national 
factors or strong firms that create comparative advantage since ‘in those cases where 
the national institutional environment, or legal structures, or specific policies, seem to 
have made a big difference, one also sees firms effectively taking advantage of the 
potential’. While firms take advantage of favourable national factors they themselves 
also upgrade national factors. 
Post-socialist national differences do not arise only from differences in national 
factor endowments and factor prices but also, and perhaps more so, from national 
institutional differences. These are explicitly taken into account in the EBRD 
assessment of progress in the transition towards an open, market economy of the CEE 
countries (see EBRD, 1994, 1995, 1996). From a systems of innovation perspective a 
relevant question in this context is what are the main national determinants of actors, 
links and competencies, i.e. the micro-determinants of SI. It is obvious that national 
differences have been important in the past and that in the post-socialist environment 
they continue to be important. National differences are pronounced in terms of growth 
so that there is an increasing divide between CEECs, especially between central 
European economies and large economies of the former Soviet Union (see von 
Hirschhausen, 1996b). In the trade structure, the relative positions of different CEE 
countries are becoming increasingly divergent (see Landesmann and Burgstaller, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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1997, and Landesmann, 1997).22 From this it would logically follow that increasing 
diversity of NSI in CEEs would also be seen.  
The NSI is a rather fuzzy concept with problems in terms of its boundaries and 
building blocks (Radosevic, 1998b). Here, we will distinguish between ‘narrow’ and 
‘broad’ NSI. By ‘narrow’ NSI we mean the R&D system and other institutions 
involved in explicit innovation activities. By ‘broad’ NSI we mean all other 
institutions which indirectly affect generation of technical change and diffusion of 
innovation. ‘Narrow’ and ‘broad’ national systems of innovation are interrelated but 
‘narrow’ NSI also has a certain degree of autonomy (Freeman, 1999). This is 
important for understanding why changes in ‘narrow’ NSI are not immediately 
reflected in ‘broad’ NSI and then in growth and recovery.  
The ‘narrow’ NSI in CEE is undergoing a large-scale functional, organisational and 
funding restructuring (see Meske et al, 1998 for evidence). From being the main 
source of R&D and innovation, extra-mural R&D organisations - especially industrial 
institutes - are transforming themselves into either R&D companies trying to meet 
diverse pockets of new R&D and non-R&D demand, or more often are turning 
themselves into non-R&D service organisations which form the core of the emerging 
business service sector in CEECs. The intensive intra-organisational restructuring of 
industrial and academic institutes is not followed by equally intensive inter-
organisational restructuring. The weak links between academy, universities, industrial 
institutes and enterprises from the past remain. Industrial institutes have not been 
integrated with industrial enterprises. Enterprises which are strapped for cash and 
long-term finance, and are facing tough foreign markets are not able to generate 
                                                 
22 For analysis in terms of institutional differences and inputs in R&D across CEECs see Radosevic 
and Auriol, 1998. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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demand for more upstream activities like R&D. In such a situation R&D is perceived 
as a liability rather than as an asset. 
What we find today in CEE are fragments of the old R&D systems which are trying 
to adjust through a set of diverse survival strategies and new pockets of innovation 
activities.23 Industrial institutes are being left on their own and are undergoing a slow 
process of conversion into different new forms (service firms, industrial enterprises). 
Academies of Science institutes, attracted by government funding as the only stable 
source, are shifting towards basic research or are diversifying sources of income to 
non-R&D activities. Universities are trying to build a new position based on the 
stability which comes from teaching but are also attempting to reorient their activities 
towards research. In-house R&D departments, where they exist, are oriented towards 
their own needs and are trying to build-up links with foreign sources of innovation. 
Domestic subsidiaries of foreign MNCs are entirely oriented towards the parent 
company in all the most important functions, including R&D, finance and marketing. 
Overall, the NSIs in CEE are fragmented and each institutional sector and 
organisation is searching for its own optimum unrelated to others. Intra-organisational 
restructuring by splitting institutes into smaller organisations or through the creation 
of spin-off firms attached to institutes dominates over inter-organisational 
restructuring involving several organisations from different sectors like industry, 
university, academy or industrial institutes.  
Is this an indication that the NSI in CEE have not been formed? In terms of 
organisational structure all CEECs do have fully developed S&T systems. However, 
this does not mean that they have also developed national innovation systems. 
Organisations which nominally belong to an R&D sector by themselves do not form a 
                                                 
23 For an extensive account of changes in R&D systems in CEE see Meske et al (1998), Knell, 
Hutschenreiter and Radosevic (1999) and Radosevic (1999). Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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system of innovations. Extensive organisational superstructure and R&D capacities 
should not be confused with the notion of innovation system, which implies 
knowledge links and knowledge flows in the innovation process as a collective 
activity. Only when organisations are linked to each other on a national scale in the 
innovation process can we talk about NSI. If we look at S&T in CEEs from this 
perspective then their national systems of innovation are still very fragmented and 
rudimentary. This fragmentation comes primarily from the weakness in the 
reconstitution of enterprises as the main network organiser of innovation processes. 
National differences in the reconstitution of enterprises are mainly determined by 
privatisation patterns. Nationally specific privatisation patterns strongly influence 
patterns of network restructuring. In eastern Germany the individual 
Treunhandanstalt-led privatisation abolished the old production networks; in the 
Czech R and Russia mass privatisation led to only a gradual transformation of 
production networks, while individual privatisation in Hungary led to the break-up of 
networks through the presence of strong foreign investors or to their restructuring 
through extensive cross-ownership. Delays in privatisation in Romania have frozen 
inter-enterprise links leading to a reduction in the scale of enterprises and institutes. 
As shown by Bell (1997) in the case of the metallurgy sector the whole system is 
frozen but operates on a smaller scale.  
The more significant the changes due to privatisation the stronger is the shift in 
enterprise boundaries and the more significant the changes in links and competencies. 
The fewer the changes resulting from privatisation the less is the deconcentration in 
industry and hence reduction in demand for R&D. In the Czech R there is a very low 
deconcentration of enterprise size. The number of enterprises with over 2.5000 
employees in 1990 was 645, in 1993 it was 508, with total employment in this group Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
 
  43 
 
 
being 645,000 in 1992 and 508,000 in 1993 (Statistical yearbooks CSFR, 1991 and 
1994 as quoted by Mueller, 1997, p. 25). This is in sharp contrast with eastern 
Germany where deconcentration of industry was extremely strong which led to almost 
the disappearance of demand for R&D (see Meske, 1997). In summary, different 
types of privatisation produce different structures of demand for R&D and technology 
given that other factors remain unchanged. 
As Freeman (1999) points out, the crucial weakness of the NSI in socialism was the 
failure to develop R&D at the enterprise level. The building of the future NSI will 
depend on how this process will progress in different countries. The increasing 
divergence in terms of growth and restructuring between ‘western’ and ‘eastern’ 
CEECs suggests that the reconstitution of enterprises as the main actors in the 
innovation process may lead to a faster emergence of NSI in central Europe than in 
CIS, Romania and Bulgaria. The reason for this is partly historical as these countries 
have inherited from the socialist period a larger share of enterprises with in-house 
R&D activities. As a result of this ‘deviation’ from the Soviet R&D model ‘in-house’ 
R&D in some large enterprises has survived the period of drastic cuts in R&D 
activities at the outset of transition.  
The new NSI will be formed by the way enterprises embodying innovation 
activities. The building of dynamic innovation systems depends on the establishment 
of framework conditions concerning privatisation, finance, legal protection, 
communication infrastructure. These elements of ‘broad’ NSI strongly influence 
innovation activities of enterprises. In the transition period they are actually more 
decisive for the innovative activities of enterprises than ‘narrow’ NSI. 
For the time being, it is not yet clear what national systems of innovation are 
emerging in the CEECs. These systems are still a long way from being formed and it Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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would be more appropriate to search first for signs of the emergence of sectoral 
innovation systems. Sectoral innovation systems are groupings of enterprises and their 
related networks of public and private institutions which are involved in the 
development, diffusion and utilisation of innovation. These systems will strongly 
shape the character of NSIs in CEE. Based on the current patterns of production 
networks in CEECs it seems that NSI will be very heterogeneous. In countries, like 
Hungary, NSI may be based more on foreign enterprises. In Russia, they may be 
formed around large domestic industrial groups. In countries like Estonia they may be 
formed around small enterprises. In some CEE countries NSI could be dual in 
character with sub-sectors of small and large firms being unrelated to each other, or 
with weak links between domestic and foreign firms. Alternatively, NSIs could be 
formed around one or two sectors where the innovation process is developed on a 
collective basis while in the rest of the economy the innovation links are very weak. 
For the time being, the innovation activities are the strongest in links with foreign 
enterprises. This suggests that in most small CEECs their NSIs could be shaped by the 
way they become integrated into international production and innovation networks. 
In general, NSIs in CEE will be shaped by the way enterprises reconstruct their 
links and embody innovation but also by the way the state regulates interaction with 
MNCs. The foreign enterprises are for the time being those that are strongly shaping 
the nature of production networks in almost all CEECs. Also, the innovation activities 
are emerging in links with foreign enterprises through different forms of alliances and 
subcontracting. However, the interaction between domestic and foreign capital is 
mediated by the state. So, political or control dimension of the process of technical 
modernisation are important in understanding the nature of the emerging NSIs in 
CEE. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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3.4. Regional determinants of emergent systems of innovation 
 
While national factors did, and still do, play an important role in the national 
technology accumulation process in the CEE, the same cannot be said for regions. 
Proximity was not an asset under socialism. A rare empirical test of this proposition is 
developed by Hare and Oakey (1993) who show the centralised pattern of service 
provision in the machine tool industry in Hungary with companies strongly 
concentrated around the Budapest area. Respondents from the plants located near or in 
Budapest experienced greater problems with local service agents than their peripheral 
counterparts. The plants with the best access to service agents were also those that 
encountered the greatest service problems. This seemingly paradoxical outcome is 
logical in conditions where the availability of a service outlet with an inferior level of 
service provision causes more difficulties than the complete absence of such 
provision. When no local servicing facilities exist, this leads to greater self-reliance 
which ensures better maintenance and repair of machines. 
The pre-socialist intra-regional forward and backward linkages were severed and 
superseded by inter-regional linkages within the branch or within the combinates. The 
individual plants of the combinates had no economic relations with the region in 
which they were located (Grabher, 1997, for eastern Germany) but they had strong 
social linkages with the region. Regions were deprived of agglomeration economies, 
that is, economies that arise from a diversified regional economic structure and that 
are essential for the long-term adaptability of regions (Grabher, 1997, p. 111). 
In the case of regions, innovation links were almost non-existent and are now to be 
developed either between large and SMEs or between SMEs themselves. The link Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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between R&D and industry at a local level has yet to be established. For example, an 
innovation survey of the Gdansk region in Poland confirms that there is still a strong 
detachment from the region and the use of local R&D institutions as a source of 
technology (see Kalinowski and Sobczak, 1996). From currently being a liability it 
will be some time before these regions become an asset in the process of technology 
accumulation.24 
The economic role of regions in CEE will differ significantly with the type of 
region. To make a diversity of the CEE situation simpler a very rough but illustrative 
grouping of regions might serve. 
 
1. Capital towns and regional centres with a diversified economic structure and 
developed infrastructure. Examples of the latter group would be Gyor (Hungary), 
Varna (Bulgaria), and Plzen (Czech R). 
 
2. Regions with a more diversified economic structure where lower industry share 
meant that they started with less structural problems. This was then followed by either 
intensive new firm formation and foreign investments. Examples are Poznan province 
in Poland and Csongrad (Szeged) in Hungary. 
 
3. Monostructural regions where a single sector heritage (defence; agriculture; heavy 
industry) makes restructuring based entirely on endogenous resources very difficult 
and in some cases almost impossible. Examples of these cases abound in Russia. One 
good example of this type is the Perm region in Russia a centre of defence industry 
(see Cronberg, 1994). An example of the old industrial centre in Hungary is the BAZ 
                                                 
24 For discussion on policy aspects of this process see Radosevic, 1999b. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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region (see Lorenzen, 1995). However, similar cases can be found even in very small 
CEE countries, like Slovenia, with its old industrial centre of Maribor. 
 
If one was to approach to regional restructuring by taking into account only the state 
of tangible regional endowments of labour, capital and natural resources it could be 
hypothesised that difficulties in regional restructuring would follow in ascending 
order from 1 to 3. However, more detailed regional situations within individual 
countries would show that this is probably not the case. An analysis of Russian 
regions by Hanson (1995) clearly shows the limitations of such an approach and 
reveals the much more complex dynamics of regional restructuring. The example of 
Nizhnii Novgorod, a heavy defence-industry dependent region but a front-runner in 
reforms in Russia, illustrates this point very well. Any comparative advantage or 
disadvantage for regional restructuring is conditional upon the existence of knowledge 
networks and network organisers.  
One of the major difficulties in regional transformation in CEE besides capital, 
infrastructure and knowledge deficiencies is the enormous co-ordination problem. For 
example, in the defence-based regions of Russia traditional links between defence 
companies and defence ministries have collapsed and new links between the regional 
administration and enterprises, and among the enterprises themselves should emerge 
in the regional context. This transformation is strongly influenced by national factors 
which, similar to the EU less developed regions (see EC, 1995), play a major role in 
determining inter-regional disparities. For example, stability in the growth of SMEs 
cannot be achieved by activities at the local level if they are to become suppliers of 
the big companies who are in difficulty.  Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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Despite the great variety of country specific regional situations there are some 
common features to regional transformation in CEE. These are in the break up of 
previously vertical channels of communication and economic management, and in the 
lack of horizontal information flows as a result of their socialist heritage. This lack of 
horizontal communication channels is being addressed already in some central 
European countries through the building up of a still very weak layer of new agencies 
which should assist regional enterprises. However, such organisations are not strong 
enough to make any significant changes to a structurally very difficult situation. This 
process is also helped by newly emerging enterprise forms like holding companies, 
financial - industrial groups, and new private conglomerates which are primarily 
horizontal structures which strengthen horizontal communication and form new input 
- output linkages. Foreign investors, for example the Suzuki supplier system in 
Hungary, are also encouraging relationships between the now fragmented large 
enterprises and SMEs. 
However, despite these trends the region as a determinant of the emergence of 
SI in CEE is still very weak. The relative share of regions with a diversified 
economic structure in CEEC seems to be lower than in the EU. With the 
proliferation of medium and small sized companies this is now changing. 
However, there are signs of clustering among SMEs or between domestic and 
foreign firms.  
 
4. Production networks and the network organiser 
 
Section 3 analysed the four determinants of the emergent systems of innovation 
in CEECs. By themselves, they are only a conditional advantage which requires Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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network organisers to be turned into a real advantages. The question is who are 
the potential network organisers that could undertake the task of organising 
systems of innovation or contribute to a transformation of the emerging 
production networks into innovation networks? This section discusses the role of 
each potential network organiser (foreign firms, domestic independent firms, 
domestic business groups, design institutes, etc.).  
Post-socialist transformation is a process of radical change in ownership and factor 
prices accompanied by simultaneous large scale institutional restructuring. It is also a 
process of recombination of the previous institutional links and integration of 
previously dislocated business functions into enterprises. The scope of these changes 
and space for possible future recombinations are constrained by the past features of 
the system or, in other words, much institutional change is path-dependent. 
A progress in ‘transition’ is usually seen as the process which contains only 
elements of change. In accordance with this, the EBRD measures progress in 
transition by focusing on changes towards the model of an open market economy (see 
EBRD, 1994; 1995; 1996). Two processes along these lines are new enterprise 
creation and unbundling of former socialist industrial combinates into stand-alone 
enterprises which should grow through generic expansion. However, together with the 
elements of change are found elements of recombination and path dependency. These 
are cases of new, durable inter-enterprise networks (e.g. post socialist holding 
companies, financial-industrial groups) and transformation of the previous branch 
administrations into enterprise (for example, telecom operators or, in the energy 
sector, the case of Russian Gazprom, see Kryukov and Moe, 1997). They indicate that 
the discontinuity of transition from plan to market is not as large as is commonly 
believed. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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Network restructuring is strongly dependent on the (non)existence of a network 
organiser. In the core of this is the problem of co-ordination and complexity of 
production networks. For example, it is mainly the simple production networks, 
i.e. woodworking, the garment industry, or commodities, that are re-orienting 
themselves relatively easily to world markets. In foreign trade this shift is present 
through the strong rise of labour-intensive, supplier dominated and commodities 
based sectors (see Landesmann, 1997; Guerrieri, 1999; Guerrieri, 1999b; 
Kubielas, 1999; Rosati, 1994).25 In the case of complex production networks, like 
those in the machinery sector, where inputs come from several enterprises and 
where payments per unit are much higher, these networks are deteriorating due to 
cash flow problems. Particularly in countries of the former Soviet Union they 
survive often only through barter. In the case of knowledge-intensive industries, 
like electronics or pharmaceuticals, once effective demand is identified, the 
accumulated skills of engineers and R&D could be more easily deployed in a 
new context than is the case with the complex engineering and capital based 
sectors.26 
The argument here is that the prospects for rebuilding the economies of the 
CEE are not only conditioned by (dis)economies in production but also can 
result from the inability of actors in production networks to self-organise due to 
institutional uncertainty and co-ordination failures which hinder the self-
organisation of industry.27 This process results in the emergence or non-
                                                 
25 For evidence in the case of Baltic economies see Radosevic, 1997b. 
26 For policy aspects of different types of production networks see Radosevic, 1994. 
27The difficulty with the empirical testing of this argument is that in real life self-organisation ability 
may not be the only constraint; the state of demand, domestic and foreign may also be an influence. 
Also, strong import competition or export restrictions from EU in ‘sensitive sectors’ like agriculture 
may hinder self-organisation of industry. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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emergence of network organisers - organisations that act as promoters of trade, 
production and/or innovation linkages. 
The ability of techno-economic networks to self-organise, probably with other 
factors unchanged, is inversely proportional to their production and 
organisational complexity. In addition, drastic currency devaluation and changes 
in relative prices resulting from liberalisation, favour primary or resource based 
production over industrial goods, with the latter being, on average, more complex 
than the former. The increased import content of exports is shifting these 
economies, at least temporarily, towards assembly-type specializations with low 
value-added (Guerrieri, 1999; Landesmann, 1997; Kubielas, 1999; Schmidt, 
1998). As a result, engineering, and industries with extensive supplier networks, 
suffer the most vis-à-vis resource or labour intensive production activities which 
are usually confined to one enterprise with rudimentary marketing requirements. 
However, it would be a mistake to argue that patterns of post-socialist industrial 
restructuring and the survival of their SI are only determined by the degree of 
complexity or simplicity of techno-economic networks. To back up this statement 
would require far more empirical research.28 Nevertheless, a valid argument may be 
that systems of innovation in post-socialism will be determined by the (non)existence 
of a network organiser. The more simple the production networks and the higher the 
quality of production the easier it is to turn around such enterprises and thus it is more 
likely that a network organiser will emerge. The more complex the production and the 
lower the underlying technological level the more difficult it will be to attract 
                                                 
28Elsewhere (Radosevic, 1997b) I tried to show in the case of Baltic states that meso variables (sectoral 
market and technological characteristics; privatisation context) in interaction with micro (top 
management behaviour; strategic partners) and macro factors (macroeconomic variables) ultimately 
shape the prospects for the development of organisational capabilities and enterprise growth in post-
socialism.  Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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investors to invest in the reconstruction of such networks as the offer of market access 
will be insufficient. 
 
4.1. Who is a potential network organiser? 
 
Who is likely to be a network organiser in the post-socialist context? One focal 
point of any new network should be a user firm. Limited and unsystematic evidence 
shows that there is a wide diversity of network organisers. Network organisers are any 
actors with the necessary capability and resources - a user or supplier firm, a bank, a 
holding company or a financial - industrial group, a foreign trade organisation, a 
design institute, a foreign firm or, in some cases, even the state. However, given the 
management, finance and technology gaps described in Section 3 it is foreign 
companies that for the time being seem to be the most active network organisers in 
CEE. 
 
Foreign firms Post-socialism creates opportunities for foreign firms to act for the 
first time in this region as organisers of domestic supply or distribution networks. In 
countries where foreign investments are relatively large, such as Hungary, or in 
sectors where foreign presence is relatively strong (telecoms, car assembly) this 
opportunity is being fully exploited. For example, telecom equipment production in 
CEECs is now dominated by foreign companies that basically shape domestic supplier 
networks. Also, foreign car producers are transferring their supplier networks into the 
region (for example, Fiat, VW, Daewoo, GM, Audi) creating in that way a nucleus of 
local systems of innovation. Large MNCs like ABB have managed to set up a new 
supply network which involves almost all CEECs and some of their subsidiaries, such Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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as Zamech, Poland, are plugged into ABB design network (Barham and Heimer, 
1998). However, foreign investors do not necessarily increase networking in the 
domestic economy. Empirical research in the case of Poland shows that while the 
internal effects of foreign investments on domestic firms have been marked, 
‘spillovers and leakages are notable by their absence’ (see Hardy, 1997). As Grabher 
(1997) shows in the case of eastern Germany only some business strategies employed 
in the region actually integrate the domestic industry (for example the food and 
construction sector) and develop regionally responsive strategies. Other strategies 
require immobilisation of regional networks or local linkages which reinforces the 
fragmentation of the local economy. This may be countered only to some extent by 
government policy which in sectors like telecom equipment, may require local 
content.29 For the time being the spread of global production and distribution 
networks across CEECs can be seen. However, this should not be equated with 
technological networks or systems of innovation. These are only partly overlapping 
and it remains to be explored to what extent these production networks embody the 
transfer of innovation and exchange of new technological knowledge. When and how 
foreign led production networks in CEE get transformed into technology networks is 
an issue which remains to be explored. 
 
Individual domestic enterprises It is argued that a possible network organiser in 
post--socialist CEECs can be any organisation with network organisational 
capabilities and resources. Individual enterprises that grow through generic expansion, 
or by mergers and acquisitions, are also potential network organisers or focal points of 
emerging sectoral systems of innovation. Fast growing private companies in sectors 
                                                 
29 For the case of Hungary in this respect see Toth (1994). Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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like software which, based on foreign solutions, build interfaces and adaptive 
solutions, are good examples (Kubielas, 1998). It is a matter for further empirical 
research to discover to what extent, by endogenously changing their circumstances 
through technology accumulation, firms are altering domestic sectoral systems of 
innovation.  
In the case of very large companies that dominate national sectors their strategic 
behaviour strongly shapes not only the sectoral but also the national systems of 
innovation.30 For example, the behaviour of ‘Skoda’, Plzen, or the Polish corporation, 
‘Elektrim’, basically shapes sectoral system of innovation in power equipment and 
related industries in these countries. The impact of the behaviour of ‘Gazprom’, the 
Russian gas producer, that is organised as a single joint-stock company and represents 
10% of Russian GDP, reaches beyond the Russian gas sector into several related 
industries (Krykov and More, 1996). 
Again, very little is known about the technology behaviour of these companies. 
Their strategy of acquisitions and divestitures does not necessarily reveal their role in 
innovation and technology acquisition. 
 
Domestic business groups Domestic business groups are becoming increasingly 
important network organisers in the CEE. Similar to NICs (see Amsden and Hikino, 
1994) the emerging capitalism of CEE may be characterised by the strong presence of 
business and industrial groups or generally large conglomerates.31 As pointed out 
earlier in this paper, their emergence in CEECs is the result of privatisation. However, 
I believe that, like the situation in NICs, there are developmental factors that explain 
their emergence, for instance, scarcity of organisational capital or undeveloped 
                                                 
30 For the role of large companies in national systems of innovation see Pavitt and Patel, 1995. 
31 For a broader discussion on the role of business groups in modern economies see Granovetter, 1995. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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financial markets. A phenomenon of CEECs’ mezzo level groups has been analysed 
more systematically in the cases of Hungary (Stark, 1997) and the Czech R 
(McDermott, 1997). In the CEE environment the most controversial role in this 
respect is that of privatisation funds acting as the intermediary between owners and 
enterprises, and their capacity to deliver long-term finance.32 This will determine 
whether they will be purely a transitional form between inter-enterprises holdings and 
bank-enterprise groupings as final forms.  
Here only a brief description is given of financial industrial groups (FIGs) which are 
the newly emerging organisational form characteristic of Russia (see Freinkman, 
1995; Gorbatova, 1995; Prokop, 1995; Starodubravskaya, 1995). FIGs are new 
market-driven forms of preserving the old networks (path dependency feature) and 
they act as a mechanism for mobilising investments and establishing or saving 
production links (INIOR, 1996). Their emergence dates back to the 1992 
corporatization and the mass privatisation that followed. Nearly all of the existing 
groups have been created in the process of privatisation and formation of securities 
market. As argued by Karlova (1996) the following methods were used: 
 
  large industrial enterprise established their own banks;  
  concerns and other associations were established on the basis of former state 
management structures (branch ministries) with further diversification of their 
activities;  
  large regional industrial holdings were formed; 
  bank and investment funds acquired shares of industrial enterprises. 
 
                                                 
32 For a discussion on this in the case of Czech R see Kenway, 1994. Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
 
  56 
 
 
However, specific to Russia some FIGs are initiated and supported by the state and 
are seen as important tools of industrial policy (Karlova, 1996). The 35 registered 
FIGs in Russia have 457 firms, 87 credit institutions, 2.5mn employment and their 
turnover is 10% of Russian GDP (Karlova, 1996, p 19). Most registered financial 
industrial groups in Russia are sectorally based which may alleviate the problem of 
scarce organisational capital. Further motives for FIGs are that they ease the liquidity 
problems of individual enterprises while banks ensure closer contact with new 
customers offering them circulation capital and, for the time being, only short-term 
loans. FIGs are also lowering the credit risk for external lenders. Holding companies 
could not solve the problem of finance as they are only associations of production 
enterprises without banks in the group. 
The main advantages of groups are that: 
 
  group costs are lower as a result of economies of scale, scope and 
vertical/horizontal (financial) integration; 
  companies have access to low-rate long-term financing and reliable banks will be 
more active in longer-term investment than those outside FIGs (INIOR, 1996). 
 
One problem associated with FIGs is their possible influence on the State (‘State 
capture’). There is a danger that groups will not contribute economically and instead 
will distort competition by increasing barriers to entry, will monopolise markets, and 
will become rent seekers. It is very likely that once the state is captured, the long-term 
agenda for growth and restructuring gets squeezed by rent-seeking. This puts forward 
important issues such as the political economy of government - business relationships. 
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Design institutes Under the former system the knowledge in design institutes was, 
in principle, greater than in enterprises. Since knowledge in enterprises is generally 
poor, we find cases, in Russia in particular, whereby design centres compensate for 
this (Alange et al, 1995) or become the main source of technical change and 
organisation of a network (Vorobjev, 1996; Shaw, 1996). As Alange et al (1995) 
show in the case of the machine tools sector, for the time being the design institute: 
 
  acts as a system integrator, by fulfilling the engineering function which is still 
undeveloped in enterprises; 
  compensates for the poor capabilities of the engineering function of enterprises; 
  functions as a bridge between academia and industry. Also, Vorobjev (1995), in the 
case of the Russian aviation industry, argues that this network is led by a few 
leading design institutes. 
 
Other actors Foreign trade organisations (FTOs) are one of actors that can 
reorganise production networks. Their position emanates from their thorough 
knowledge of domestic and foreign markets. Banks can also take on the role of 
network organisers by turning around companies and then selling them on. This 
process is still rare but is likely to be ongoing as margins from financial operations 
shrink and banks turn to the real economy. In some cases the State is taking on the 
role of network organiser in an attempt to create a national cluster (for example, in the 
Polish petrochemical industry).  
To summarise, the diversity of possible network organisers that are likely to operate 
as central institutions in emerging systems of innovation in CEE has been highlighted 
Although it is not yet possible to provide sufficient systematic evidence of this I Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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would argue that foreign firms have gone the farthest as network organisers. The 
cases of several industrial sectors in CEECs suggest the dominant role of foreign 
enterprises as network organisers. However, it does not follow from this that they will 
automatically play a major role in domestic national systems of innovation. 
Production networks are not identical to technological networks and an important 
issues for CEECs is to what extent foreign firms will be embedded into the domestic 
economy. It can also be expected that domestic business groups will play an equally 
important role once the ownership structure becomes stabilised. 
At a more general level, the emergence of new patterns of production and 
innovation links can be seen. Knowledge flows between different branches, between 
foreign sellers and domestic users, and between users and R&D become possible. For 
the first time knowledge links may be between users (producing company) and design 
institutes. In some, though still rare cases, this leads to institutes being taken over by 
the company. 
The market economy does not necessarily bring a strengthening of all innovation 
links compared with socialism. In principle, unlike the case of design institutes, the 
link between R&D institutes and domestic user firms has weakened as a result of the 
R&D institute becoming detached from industry due to lack of industry funding. 
Similarly, links between R&D and design institutes have weakened (see Bell, 1997). 
The strongest links are with foreign partners. While this seems obvious in the case 
of FDI it is not so in the case of alliances. Here a diversity of links in terms of 
dependence/interdependency and in terms of market and production/technology focus 
can be found.33 In subcontracting relationships such links often have features of 
dependence.  
                                                 
33 For a discussion on alliances in CEECs see Radosevic (1999c, 1999d). Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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In conclusion, in post-socialism new patterns of links between enterprises, buyers, 
sellers, and foreign partners are proliferating. While patterns of innovation are 
becoming more sector specific and, in that respect, more diverse the rise of mezzo 
industrial groups and foreign firms as important network organisers indicates the 
possibility of widespread cross-sectoral knowledge links. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
1. The paper is based on the proposition derived from systems of innovation literature 
that catching up and growth of the CEECs is closely related to the emergence of 
systems of innovation be they inter-firm, sectoral, regional, national or global. 
 
2. The socialist period was interpreted here through a systems of innovation 
perspective. The proposition was developed that the post-socialist economies are 
characterised by the transformation of a single standalone S&T system into a diverse 
array of systems of innovation. The main problem under socialism were not links per 
se but the inability of firms to embody innovation and to act as a network organiser. 
Instead, network organisers were ministries and branch R&D institutes. This led to 
unrelated flows of production, market and technology knowledge and finance which 
resulted in a slow pace of innovation and weak structural change.  
 
3. This paper analysed micro, sectoral, national and regional determinants of systems 
of innovation. Although in CEECs one still cannot talk of developed systems of 
innovation there are several determinants and processes which work towards their 
emergence. The conclusion is that the systems of innovation in CEECs are emerging Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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through the interaction of micro-, sector-, national- and regionally- specific factors. 
This explains why the boundaries of systems of innovation are indeterminate as 
suggested by the recent literature on systems of innovation, i.e. SI can be at firm level, 
national, sectoral or regional (see Edquist, 1997). The indeterminacy comes from the 
mutual influence of each determinant in generating systems of innovation. 
 
4. Systems of innovation in the post-socialist period in CEE are primarily driven by 
micro, and sectoral determinants. Innovation activities are still very much confined to 
individual enterprises or groupings of enterprises through parent companies (MNCs, 
domestic business groups). The patterns of innovation have become sector specific, 
i.e. they reflect the nature of technological regime in the industry given the market, 
technology and finance gaps of CEE producers. 
The organisation of innovation activities which would reflect sectoral specificities 
was suppressed during the socialist period. Patterns of innovation in terms of 
appropriability and organisation were highly uniform across the entire industrial 
spectrum. In the post-socialist context there is an increasing diversity of sources of 
technical change as well as appropriability mechanisms. The innovation patterns of 
individual enterprises reflect a diversity of patterns of innovation typical for 
individual sector.  
It is not yet possible to talk about national or regional systems of innovation in the 
CEECs. The only emerging systems of innovation seem to be those around foreign 
firms, and possibly around domestic business groups. A still turbulent process of 
industrial transformation does not allow national or regional responses to be 
articulated in a way that would lead to national or regional systems of innovation. 
Systems of innovation are in the process of articulation through a period of intensive Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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trial and error by enterprises, governments and foreign partners. This is especially 
valid for growing central European economies.  
 
5. The process of selection and development of network organisers is at the core of 
the emergent SI. In principle, these could be any of the organisations involved in the 
collective process of innovation creation and diffusion. However, the actual process is 
the result of a complex interaction of nationally specific factors, opportunities to 
recombine the existing competencies and link them to world production networks as 
well as the degree of change in factor and product markets. 
So far, foreign enterprises have been the main organisers of production networks. 
Their inherent advantages in terms of access to finance, control over technology and 
organisational capabilities give them first mover advantages which domestically 
controlled firms are not able to match. However, domestic independent enterprises 
and business groups are now beginning to act as network organisers. In Russia, where 
national institutional specificities and historical heritage are different domestic 
network organisers are much more frequently found. This is the result of different 
patterns of privatization and political control of modernization process. In addition, 
developmental and economic factors also contribute to an increasing role by domestic 
business groups. Some of these may be common to the explanations of industrial 
groups in other latecomer economies (see Amsden and Hikino, 1994). 
 
6. Elsewhere, the intensive process of reconstruction of production networks, which 
are focused around business groups, has been analysed at great length (see Grabher 
and Stark, 1997). However, the concern here is with innovation networks or the 
prospects for the emergence of different innovation networks which are not identical Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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to production networks. Grabher and Stark (1997) analyse networks based on 
ownership and informal links but not on innovation and technology links. For 
example, a standalone company may have intensive knowledge links with other 
enterprises and yet not be linked through diverse informal or ownership links. These 
cases occur when enterprises have chosen to alienate themselves from any networks 
and to be free from any implicit and explicit obligations.34 While their analysis may 
describe very well the morphology of new ownership and production networks it does 
not explain the underlying factors of growth and the prospects for the growth of such 
networks. The inquiry is extremely useful but is not sufficient for a complete 
understanding of the innovation properties of new ownership and production 
networks.  
 
7. The current modes and levels of integration of CEECs into international production 
networks may not by themselves ensure their growth and recovery. The current 
pattern of industrial upgrading, which is most often led by foreign enterprises, may 
reach its limits unless followed by domestically generated innovation activities. There 
are limits to which the lack of domestic in-house R&D could be compensated for by 
extra-mural R&D system or foreign R&D. The weaknesses in ‘narrow’ NSI will 
become visible through weak in-house R&D, weak university - industry links, and a 
lack of technological co-operation among enterprises. In order to grow these 
economies will have to generate their own innovation dynamics which can 
                                                 
34For example, in sample of 24 Russian defence sector enterprises, 50% of them were those who 
pursued the fragile adjustment driven by the top manager who does not seek the benefits and 
obligations of network participation (Kuznetsov, 1997, p. 25). However, Kuznetsov holds that the 
prevailing attitude is to carve out new networks combining the viable elements of the old and a closer 
association with banks, trading companies and other agents of the nascent private sector(Kuznetsov, 
1997). Despite this it should be borne in mind that there are knowledge and innovation links in CEECs 
which are not of the recombination type as analysed by Stark (1997). Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 10 (1999) 277–320 
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complement technology import. The core of these dynamics should be strong R&D 
and innovation activities of domestic enterprises. 
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